1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	UNIVERSITAS EDUCATION, LLC,)
5) Plaintiff)
6) No. 1:15-cv-11848-DPW vs.
7	JACK E. ROBINSON, III A/K/A) JACK E. ROBINSON,)
9) Defendant)
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11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
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13	MOTION HEARING AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
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16	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 1
17	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210
18	Friday, December 11, 2015 2:05 p.m.
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21	Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR
22	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse
23	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210
24	(617) 439-3214
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1	APPEARANCES:
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3	RIEMER & BRAUNSTEIN By: Paul S. Samson, Esq. Three Center Plaza 6th Floor Boston, MA 02108 On behalf of the Plaintiff.
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7	LOEB & LOEB LLP
8	By: Paula K. Colbath, Esq. 345 Park Avenue
9	New York, NY 10154 On behalf of the Plaintiff.
10	THE LAW OFFICES OF CETT I MADOUS
11	THE LAW OFFICES OF SETH L. MARCUS By: Seth L. Marcus, Esq. Suite 101
12	777 Westchester Ave. White Plains, NY 10604
13	On behalf of the Defendant.
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(The following proceedings were held in open court before the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, United States District Judge, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, at the John J. Moakley United States Courthouse, One Courthouse Way, Courtroom 1, Boston, Massachusetts, on Friday, December 11, 2015):

THE LAW CLERK: All rise.

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(The Honorable Court entered the courtroom at 2:05 p.m.)

THE LAW CLERK: This is Civil Case No. 15-11848, Universitas Education, LLC v. Robinson. This Honorable Court is now in session. You may be seated.

THE COURT: Well, maybe I can cut to the chase a bit on this. On the assumption that I am going to say that there is at least adequate pleading to show that knowledge took place as late as November of 2012, and that Massachusetts law would look to New York law for conflict purposes, what else is there to say about the Motion to Dismiss from the defendant's point of view?

MR. MARCUS: Those are two of the major points that we are disputing. I would urge that they should be decided otherwise, but if that is not a point that you would like to hear argument on --

THE COURT: I do not think so. My view is that it may well be that there is a jury question with respect to statute of limitations if it is contested. But my reading of the

pleadings tells me that it is plausibly alleged that the plaintiff is not chargeable with the kind of inquiry knowledge until the point at which Magistrate Judge Pitman issued his subpoena enforcement decision. I am not foreclosing the development of that issue but simply saying that for Motion to Dismiss purposes it is not here. So, that is a fact question.

The question of the application of choice of law here is a law question I have thought about a lot, and I am satisfied that Massachusetts Courts would apply the law of New York in dealing with the several claims that are presented here. You can argue, if you want, but that is why I said I am cutting to the chase on this thing.

MR. MARCUS: My argument would be restating what was in my brief, and I thought that it was persuasive. However, and I assume there will be a decision on --

THE COURT: Well, there is a decision right now. I will probably issue something to deal with that, but we are going to talk about how we get this case ready to try and for factual development. I do not want to go any further with this. It has kicked around a little while. It has kicked around a while in the Southern District of New York. I want to get to this and get to it promptly.

So, the one maybe hangnail left, I suppose, is the question of the citizenship of Mr. Robinson. It is claimed that it is not properly alleged. I think that is right, but I

am not dismissing the case on that basis. If there has to be discovery on it, there will be discovery on it.

If he practices law in the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, there is enough there for me to perceive,

anyway, that he is a citizen of Massachusetts. But if you want

to press that, then I will let you come back at it with a

Motion to Dismiss after some factual discovery. Do you really
think it is in dispute?

MR. MARCUS: I think even in our papers it is a pleading question. It was really more of a pleading question as we raised in our papers, so, yeah, I mean, I think that's probably correct.

THE COURT: So, I am not going to set out a separate process for that. I would suggest to the plaintiffs that they may want to amend their Complaint when they have a good-faith basis for actually asserting citizenship in Massachusetts. If you do not have that basis, of course you have got a Rule 11 problem, so you will probably want to tack that down, but that can be done, I think, with a simple interrogatory directed to Mr. Robinson on it. I will permit the pleadings to be tidied up in that sense as well.

The claim for conversion, I think, and the claim for professional malpractice, that is, the sixth claim for relief and the ninth claim for relief, seem to me to be time barred. Not that that makes any difference in the larger scheme of

things, but I think they are going to be out, so I just want you to know that. And, of course, they have withdrawn the claim for statutory theft in this case. But the case goes forward with these claims in it.

Now, what do we need to get it going here? How long?

MR. MARCUS: We need an answer, your Honor, first and foremost.

THE COURT: Of course, but that is going to be perhaps even expedited in this case. Now I am talking about what do you need to get the case --

MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, Paul Samson for the plaintiff. When we were last here on the status conference and we filed our Rule 26(f) plan, we set things out two ways. One was assuming the Court proceeded right away with this, and another way is, assuming the Court stayed everything until the Motion to Dismiss result, how many days after resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. So, to the extent that it is viewed as being denied today --

THE COURT: It is denied today.

MR. SAMSON: -- the agreed schedule, I think, plugs right into the number of days after --

THE COURT: Well, let's go through it, not just number of days afterwards, because the number of days afterwards are more than the number of fingers I have on both hands, and so I would like to have dates certain to deal with all of this.

MR. SAMSON: Okay. Initial disclosures we were talking roughly two, two and a half weeks at the time. Can I suggest two weeks from today?

MR. MARCUS: Well, your Honor, actually, first, that's why I sort of mentioned an answer. I would like to be able to put in an answer before we start doing initial disclosures.

THE COURT: I do not think so. Listen, this case is one in which there will be no tolerance for any delays that are unnecessary. You can file your answer. That is fine. But you had your Motion to Dismiss practice on it. Now we will get going on it. I do not think that the answer is going to refine the discovery that much.

MR. MARCUS: Then, the only other point that I would make is the week after next I am going to be away for a week.

If you could give me a week from when I get back, which would be sort of very early January to start things off?

THE COURT: Well, let me put it this way: Nobody gets discovery --

MR. MARCUS: Right.

THE COURT: -- no side gets discovery until they have done their initial disclosures. They disclose earlier, they start to get discovery. That is to say that they get to start to file for discovery and move forward on discovery. You do not until you do your initial disclosures. I am not sure that makes very much difference either, but it is at least implicit

in the rule or explicit in the rule as one of the ways that we police this. So, I guess I will say would January 8th be sufficient for you to --

MR. MARCUS: That would be fine, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: So, initial disclosures are due no later than January 8th. Now, if the plaintiff does its initial disclosures before, it can get going on discovery.

But let's move to the next date. Initial disclosures on January 8th.

MR. SAMSON: Demands for document discovery, we had that --

THE COURT: Let me tell you something more broadly.

My view is I will talk about fact discovery. How you organize your fact discovery, when you do your depositions, when you do your interrogatories, when you do your demands for documents is really up to you. I am not going to choreograph it that finely, but I will set a date for fact discovery, which includes depositions, and it means all fact discovery done. It does not mean on the night before fact discovery ends a series of interrogatories are filed or deposition subpoenas.

So, what do you want?

MR. SAMSON: When we filed our report we agreed on June 15th. We filed the report on September 22nd. So, add two months and a few days to June 15th for fact discovery?

THE COURT: So, that is all of fact discovery?

2 MR. SAMSON: Yes, and disclosure of experts is what we 3 had agreed on.

THE COURT: Disclosure of experts to take place at the confusion of fact discovery?

MR. SAMSON: Yes, the names of the experts. The expert reports are a different date.

THE COURT: So, if I set, let's say, September 9 --

MR. SAMSON: That's agreeable, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- for fact discovery? If I do not hear objections, it is going to be the date.

MR. MARCUS: That's fine, your Honor.

MR. SAMSON: We did in the report seek to reserve the right to go more than seven hours on some of the key witnesses, but our plan was to play that by ear. If we take the deposition and we feel in good faith that we do not have enough time to complete it for one reason or another, then we would ask the Court for more time.

THE COURT: This is one of those things in which what goes around comes around, which is the legal principle that is going to guide all of this. First, you work it out among yourselves. I have a feeling that you will work it out among yourselves, because you both have an interest in both concise depositions but also perhaps going longer on certain depositions.

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               MR. SAMSON: We did agree, for the record, the keeper
      of the record, document-only subpoenas don't count to the
      ten-deposition limit.
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               THE COURT: Again, that is a matter that I will leave
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      to you.
               MR. SAMSON: Okay. We had agreed on the opening
      expert reports by both sides on June 30 of next year. So, add
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      two and a half months to that.
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               THE COURT: September 30?
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               MR. SAMSON:
                           Yes.
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               THE COURT: Because September 9th is close of fact
      discovery and identification by name of experts.
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               MR. SAMSON:
                            Then --
               THE COURT: Hold on a second. I am slower than you
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      guys are.
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               MR. SAMSON: I'm sorry.
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               THE COURT: So, September 30 for Rule 26 reports.
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               MR. SAMSON: For the opening reports.
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               THE COURT: Pardon me?
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               MR. SAMSON: For the opening reports.
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. SAMSON: And then an additional 45 days is what
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      the parties had agreed on for the rebuttal reports, which would
      take you to November 15th.
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               THE COURT: Why so long for rebuttal reports?
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are the reports here? It is a fraud case. What are the reports here?

MR. SAMSON: Thirty days is fine. We can do it in less time than 45 days. The Court's right.

THE COURT: Now that you have got my attention, what do you think these experts are going to be? They are going to be accountants, right?

MR. SAMSON: Probably, if there are any experts, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. I have some question about that, but go ahead.

MR. SAMSON: There's an issue as to whether or not the judgment has been warranted uncollectible and whether or not you can reasonably estimate future damages or its too speculative and you run into the problems of the Bankers Trust and this Stochastic case. But I don't know that we will have an expert on that. It's just a possibility.

THE COURT: You have got one. You are looking at him, I think. I think that is my responsibility. I do not think that bringing in someone to talk about that is going to be so helpful, and I am not sure exactly how that works. But, in any event --

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, I wasn't sure that there were going to be experts in this case either, but to the extent that the plaintiffs wanted to preserve their ability to do it if

they saw fit, I just want to preserve equitable ability to respond properly.

THE COURT: Sure. So, what I am going to say is that, assuming experts, then rebuttal experts November 4th.

MR. SAMSON: We left 45 days for expert discovery.

THE COURT: All right. So, I will make that expert discovery completed the eve before New Year's Eve, which is December 30. That will complete the expert discovery.

MR. SAMSON: And both sides felt that any dispositive motions could be filed within 15 days of the conclusion of expert discovery. We will have the facts and reports by then.

THE COURT: But now let's get to this point of are there experts, and if there are not experts what happens to dispositive motions. What I am going to tell you is, because I do not see people running up the bill for useless experts, that if there are not going to be any experts, and they will have been identified by September 9th, or not, then if there are not going to be any experts, then dispositive motions due September 30th.

MR. SAMSON: That's agreeable to us, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then opposition by -- I will give you November 4th on the opposition there. Those can be cross-motions, that is up to you. But we are not going to have any more briefing than that. And we will have a motion hearing on November 30th for dispositive motions.

1 MR. MARCUS: I'm sorry, your Honor. I didn't get the date for oppositions to the motion. 2 THE COURT: The opposition will be November 4th. 3 4 is playing off the putative expert times so that the Motions 5 for Summary Judgment will be September 30, assuming that there 6 are no experts. MR. MARCUS: I just suggest maybe November 4th is a 7 little tight on an opposition to a summary judgment motion. 8 9 THE COURT: Oh, I beg your pardon. Oh, no, I do not. 10 I stand by it. September 30th to November 4th? 11 MR. SAMSON: That's 35 days. 12 MR. MARCUS: I'm sorry. I must have gotten the 13 dispositive motion date wrong. I had 9/30 as the dispositive 14 motion. THE COURT: That is the date for dispositive motion. 15 16 MR. MARCUS: I apologize. 17 THE COURT: I am fully prepared to believe that I said it wrong too, but now we are going to get it right. 18 19 MR. MARCUS: I just skipped to October. That's fine. 20 THE COURT: So, assuming no experts, then it is 21 September 30 for dispositive motions and oppositions 22 November 4th, with a dispositive motion hearing date of 23 November 30, and if there are experts, then we will deal with 24 that separately.

So, if you file with or if experts are submitted and

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you think you have to have experts for purposes of summary judgment, and I am not sure that the experts are going to change summary judgment one way or the other, you are in fact-dispute land if you have got experts, as far as I am concerned. So, I think I am going to use that dispositive motion date, in any event, and maybe tell you that we will put off experts until after dispositive motions. Doesn't that work right?

MR. SAMSON: If there are dispositive motions, and it may be that the parties each concede there are issues of fact that need to be resolved.

THE COURT: Oh, I want to emphasize that a sure way of making me grumpy is to file a dispositive motion that has no chance in hell of getting allowed on the benighted thought that I might be educated by it but not dispose of it. Do not do it. Dispositive motions should dispose of something and you have a realistic likelihood of disposing of something.

But I will use that as the date for dispositive motions, irrespective of whether or not you identify experts on September 9th, but I think you should identify the experts on September 9th and then, when we have the dispositive-motion filing and you either file or you do not file, if you do not file we will go forward with experts, if you do we will not, and you do not file a Motion for Summary Judgment, I will get it set down for some sort of pretrial hearing or pretrial

process for filings and so on.

MR. SAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. I did want to make one comment on the diversity question. There is a federal statute that I know this Court has referred to in another decision, but here's what happened: When Ms. Colbath took his deposition in 2012 he had a Massachusetts driver's license and said that he lived at a place in Duxbury. We did a title search before we brought this case. That was his parents' house, and the house has been sold, and he hasn't told us where he claims he lives now.

THE COURT: But now you do your initial disclosures and you can ask him a question --

MR. SAMSON: Right, right.

THE COURT: -- about, "Where did you live at the time that the lawsuit was brought?" That is what we are dealing with here.

MR. SAMSON: Exactly. I know.

THE COURT: So, if you want to kind of tie that down, you will do it. As I said, the defendant here raises a matter of pleading. I think it can be adequately addressed. If you do not address it and they still raise it, I will entertain a Motion to Dismiss on that ground. So, I would get it straightened away, but this is something that can be resolved.

MR. SAMSON: It should be easily resolved, your Honor, by the parties.

1 THE COURT: Right.

2 MR. SAMSON: Either there is diversity or there is 3 not.

THE COURT: Right. And if there is not, we are still here on a form of supplemental jurisdiction, in any event, on it. If ultimately the RICO claim goes out, I still think I would probably exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the case, if there is a basis for assuming, as I do, that the RICO claims are the same as, the same common nucleus of fact as the remaining claims for relief. Okay?

MR. SAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, what I would like you to do, both of you, while we have taken down what these dates are, you will reduce them to writing as your understanding of them, file it with us by next week, say, Tuesday of next week; that initial disclosure issues will be made no later than January 8th, that all fact discovery will be completed by September 9th, 2015, and on September 9th of 2015 there will be identification by name of any experts to be filed. Dispositive motions will be filed by September 30, oppositions by November 4th, a dispositive motion date at 2:30 on November 30th in this courtroom, and on a parallel track, if there are experts, you will file your Rule 26 expert reports by September 30, your rebuttal experts by November 4th, and expert depositions will be completed by December 30.

I think that covers everything that we can deal with right now.

MR. SAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MARCUS: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. COLBATH: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: It may take a little bit of time, but I will get something in writing that explains more completely what my views are.

MR. MARCUS: Yes, sir. One thing I do want to be clear on in reporting back to my client is the statute of limitations defense. The essential ruling is going to be that there are factual issues with regard to statute of limitations, so those can still be raised as defenses?

THE COURT: Right. No, I do not consider it to have been resolved. I simply consider that you have a very high standard that you have to meet for purposes of an affirmative defense like statute of limitations, and that really is that there is no basis in the pleadings to believe that the statute of limitations has not been exceeded. I find in these pleadings that there is a basis for doing that, and that is that this could be as late as the date on which Magistrate Judge Pitman issued his order with respect to the subpoenas. You may argue earlier, you may have a factual development of earlier. I would not be too sanguine about that, but there it is. It is not resolved by me as a matter of law yet, and that

is where it is going to go. With respect to the other ones, I think it is pretty clear I am going to let New York law apply here. I think that that is what the Massachusetts Courts would do under these circumstances. MR. MARCUS: Okay. THE COURT: But I will try to give you something. know what you need, and I will try to give you something that is a little bit more fulsome in explanation of it, but it may take a little while, because I will be working on some other things. Okay? MR. SAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. MS. COLBATH: Thank you, your Honor. MR. MARCUS: Thank you, your Honor. THE LAW CLERK: All rise. (The Honorable Court exited the courtroom at 2:30 p.m.) (WHEREUPON, the proceedings adjourned at 2:30 p.m.)

1	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>
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4	I, Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR and Official Reporter
5	of the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the
6	foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my skill and
7	ability, a true and accurate transcription of my stenotype
8	notes taken in the matter of $\mathit{Universitas}\ \mathit{Education}\ \mathit{LLC}\ \mathit{v.}$
9	Robinson, No. 1:15-cv-11848-DPW.
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14	Date: December 17, 2015 /s/ Brenda K. Hancock Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR
15	Official Court Reporter
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